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China holds the key to solving many questions crucial
to global control of severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS). The disease appears to have originated in
Guangdong Province, and the causative agent, SARS
coronavirus, is likely to have originated from an animal
host, perhaps sold in public markets. Epidemiologic find-
ings, integral to defining an animal-human linkage, may be
confirmed by laboratory studies; once animal host(s) are
confirmed, interventions may be needed to prevent further
animal-to-human transmission. Community seroprevalence
studies may help determine the basis for the decline in dis-
ease incidence in Guangdong Province after February
2002. China will also be able to contribute key data about
how the causative agent is transmitted and how it is evolv-
ing, as well as identifying pivotal factors influencing disease
outcome. 
S
evere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a newly
emerged disease, caused by a previously unknown
coronavirus. The first known cases occurred in Guangdong
Province in southern China in November and December
2002. During late February 2003, a physician who was
incubating SARS traveled from Guangzhou, the provincial
capital, to Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region of
China, and stayed at a hotel. There, the virus was transmit-
ted from him to local residents and to travelers, who
became ill and transmitted disease to others when they
returned to Vietnam, Singapore, Canada, and Taiwan,
Province of China (1). SARS has now occurred in >8,450
people with >800 deaths worldwide. 
The tally of SARS climbed rapidly in China through
May 2003, then decelerated markedly during June. The
disease has now been reported in 24 of China’s 31
provinces. By June 26, 2003, a total of 5,327 SARS cases
and 348 deaths had been reported from mainland China,
including 2,521 cases in Beijing and 1,512 in Guangdong
Province.
Since February 2003, teams of technical consultants for
the World Health Organization have been working in
China to provide assistance to the Ministry of Health and
provincial governments on public health responses to the
SARS outbreak. A team that began working in China in
March reviewed considerable clinical, epidemiologic, and
laboratory data with scientists and officials from a variety
of settings in Guangdong Province and Beijing. The team
worked closely with colleagues from the National and
Guangdong Provincial Centers for Disease Control, and
together were able to establish that cases occurring in
Guangdong beginning in November were clinically and
epidemiologically similar to subsequent cases of SARS
documented elsewhere. 
The team observed detailed, comprehensive data col-
lection forms, which are completed for activities and
behaviors and clinical manifestations of patients with
SARS. The team was informed that serum and respiratory
secretion specimens collected from many patients from
Guangdong were being held under appropriate storage
conditions, awaiting further laboratory testing. 
While a dedicated, collaborative international effort has
resulted in substantial understanding of this disease with
remarkable speed, critical information is still lacking. We
detail a variety of knowledge gaps that should be
addressed through a set of activities to optimize prevention
and control of SARS. 
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Coronavirus in Humans
Available evidence suggests that SARS emerged in
Guangdong Province, in southern China. How and when
did it emerge? Did the causative agent evolve in an animal
species and jump to humans (or perhaps first to other ani-
mal species), or did the virus evolve within humans? The
genetic sequence of the virus has been obtained in several
laboratories, and phylogenetic analyses have shown that it
is unlike other coronaviruses of animal and human origin.
Indeed, the virus has been tentatively placed in a new
fourth genetic group (2,3). 
Why is it so important to answer the question of how
SARS emerged? Most recently recognized novel emergent
viruses have been zoonotic, usually with a reservoir in
wildlife (4,5). Thus, SARS coronavirus, if zoonotic, may
provide the basis for modeling and predicting the appear-
ance of other potential zoonotic human pathogens. More
importantly, the information may be crucial for control of
SARS. If this disease is to be curtailed or eliminated by
strict public health measures, blocking further animal-to-
human transmission is indicated. Only about half of the
cases in Guangdong are attributed to contact with a SARS
patient. Transmission from an unknown, but persisting ani-
mal reservoir might explain this finding; however, a non-
specific case definition (i.e., many “cases” might not actu-
ally be SARS) and limitations in contact-tracing capacity
are other potential explanations.
Finding a potential animal source is, however, a daunt-
ing task. The province is famous for its “wet markets,”
where a bewildering variety of live fauna are offered for
sale (sometimes illegally) for their medicinal properties or
culinary potential. The opportunity for contact, not only
with farmed animals but also with a variety of otherwise
rare or uncommon wild animals, is enormous. More than
one third of early cases, with dates of onset before
February 1, 2003, were in food handlers (persons who han-
dle, kill, and sell food animals, or those who prepare and
serve food) (Guangdong Province Center for Disease
Control and Prevention, unpub. data,).
Hypothesis-generating epidemiologic studies are indi-
cated to focus on early cases of SARS and cases in persons
without known contact with infected persons. These stud-
ies should also collect information from appropriately
selected controls (i.e., matched by categories such as com-
munity and age), regarding exposures to animals of any
kind in any setting (including food preparation, dietary
habits, pets, and a variety of other activities and behaviors
in the community). 
Plausible hypotheses generated by epidemiologic stud-
ies should be briskly followed by intensive, focused, labo-
ratory studies where relevant, including surveys of specif-
ic animal populations to identify SARS-associated coron-
aviruses (by culture and polymerase chain reaction [PCR])
or to measure specific antibodies. Some virologic surveys
have already been conducted among prevalent animal pop-
ulations, including those known to harbor other coron-
aviruses or other viruses transmissible to humans or wild
animals, handled and sold in the markets; a variety of ani-
mals, most notably masked palm civets, have been report-
ed to harbor SARS-associated coronavirus. However,
whether these animals are transmitting virus or are recipi-
ents of virus transmission is not yet clear. Solutions will lie
with identifying epidemiologic links, which should guide
targeted animal studies. Molecular epidemiologic and
genetic studies can then be helpful in evaluating viruses
isolated from animals and from humans. 
Natural History of the Epidemic
Since the earliest known cases were in Guangdong
Province, China has had more time than any other location
to observe disease incidence over time. Evidence from
Guangdong Provincial Centers for Disease Control sug-
gests that the disease incidence peaked in mid-February,
and declined weekly through May. What were the reasons
for the decline? Introduction of stringent infection-control
measures in hospital settings undoubtedly resulted in
reduced incidence in healthcare settings but would not
likely have accounted for reductions in community trans-
mission. Efforts have been made to reduce the interval
between onset of illness and hospitalization (minimizing
the potential for community transmission). This effort like-
ly had substantial impact in reducing disease incidence, as
shown elsewhere (6).
The initial hypothesis was that the virus attenuated after
multiple generations of transmission; this hypothesis now
seems unlikely. We note several other considerations. Were
there a limited number of susceptible people within the
population to begin with? Such a concept is possible if
there had been earlier spread of a less virulent coronavirus,
providing some immunity to a proportion of the popula-
tion. If so, whether this occurrence was unique to
Guangdong will be important to determine. 
Alternatively, did the population develop widespread
immunity to the causative agent itself? This scenario
would require a good deal of asymptomatic or mildly
symptomatic disease. At this stage, no reason exists to
exclude the possibility of a much wider spectrum of dis-
ease than is currently appreciated, since the spectrum of
illness has not been fully evaluated.
Another possibility is that a second agent might be
required, in addition to coronavirus, to produce severe ill-
ness; if this is the case, the epidemiology (like seasonality)
of the second agent (perhaps a less recently emerged
pathogen for which there is already fairly widespread
immunity), rather than coronavirus, may actually be
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Guangdong.
Extensive seroprevalence studies will be helpful for
sorting through these possibilities. Analyzing stored serum
samples, collected before the onset of this outbreak, could
be of immense value in evaluating the possibility of preex-
isting immunity. Some researchers have found human
metapneumoviruses (7) and species of Chlamydia in
patients with SARS, but the importance of these findings
is unclear. Systematic evaluation of specimens available
from all cases, severe cases, and healthy controls in China
regarding the presence of antibodies to coronavirus, as
well as hypothesized co-infecting agents, should be done. 
Important clues may come from seroprevalence and
other epidemiologic studies in children. As in other affect-
ed countries, children were disproportionately less affect-
ed by SARS than adults. Carefully working through the
bases for reduced incidence and severity may uncover
cross-protecting infectious or immunizing agents or cru-
cial host factors for protection. 
Super-Spreading Events
When documenting the source of person-to-person
transmission of SARS has been possible, a substantial pro-
portion of cases have emanated from single persons, so-
called super-spreaders (l). While contact tracing is
undoubtedly incomplete, most infected patients have trans-
mitted illness to few other people. Understanding the dif-
ferentiating characteristics of persons who transmit, espe-
cially patients who are able to transmit to several other
people, often after minimal contact, may provide impor-
tant clues for public health strategies focused on prevent-
ing transmission. In addition, better defining environmen-
tal settings or circumstances that facilitate high transmis-
sion rates would be helpful. China is not unique in docu-
menting super-spreaders. The country could participate in
multinational studies to define the characteristics of super-
spreaders and their role in the epidemiology of SARS. Of
particular interest is the virus load of super-spreaders,
compared with those of other infected persons.
Little is known about the importance of fecal-oral trans-
mission or about the length of time that infectious virus
shedding occurs in the gastrointestinal tract. Virus shedding
in feces has major implications for control strategies and for
the possibility of continued carriage and shedding by clini-
cally recovered patients. China has the opportunity to
explore the role of fecal spread in the transmission of SARS.
Evolution of the Virus
The causative agent is a coronavirus (8–10), and the
entire genome of several strains has been fully sequenced
by many laboratories globally (2,3,11). Tests have been
developed to detect coronavirus genetic sequences by
PCR. In addition, tests to detect SARS-associated coron-
avirus antibodies have been developed, but the sensitivity
and specificity of these tests are low, especially early in the
illness when public health and clinical needs are greatest.
A good test for SARS would be important not only for
diagnosis and management but also for investigating the
origin of the disease and for defining its epidemiology.
If the causative agent can be isolated from stored spec-
imens from the earliest group of patients (from November
2002 to January 2003), how their genetic sequences com-
pare with those from viruses isolated later from various
parts of China and elsewhere, and from animals from
Guangdong and Guanxi Provinces, would be useful to
know. Mutations may be important for a number of rea-
sons. They may affect transmissibility and virulence; they
may provide (or frustrate) therapeutic targets for new
drugs; and they may pose challenges for development of
diagnostic tests and vaccines. Specimens from Chinese
patients provide the longest observation window with
which mutational tendencies can be evaluated. 
An analysis of 14 full-length sequences suggests that
two genetic lineages might have arisen from Guangdong.
One lineage is represented by the chain of transmission
associated with the physician from Guangzhou who trav-
eled to Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region, in
February. The other lineage is associated with isolates
from Hong Kong, Guangzhou, and Beijing (11). If two
genetic lineages arose in Guangdong, were there two sep-
arate transmission events from an animal host to humans,
or did the lineage diverge within humans? Specimens from
early cases in Guangdong may be helpful in addressing
this question.
Outcomes of Infection
Epidemiologic, immunologic, and microbiologic fac-
tors associated with severe outcome are not fully defined.
Clearly, though, a principal determinant for poor outcome
is advancing age. As with other respiratory diseases, age-
related coexisting conditions reduce the capacity to com-
pensate to conditions associated with severe disease.
Understanding other specific factors that result in poor
outcome will have value for optimizing therapeutic
approaches.
Clinicians disagree about the value of early treatment
with ribavirin and high-dose corticosteroids, and some are
reticent to ventilate patients because of high risk for trans-
mission to healthcare workers associated with intubation.
More data are needed to help define the most effective
treatment strategy, particularly for areas with limited
resources. 
Extraordinary clinical expertise exists among health
professionals in Guangdong Province. They have substan-
tial experience with a variety of antivirals, antibiotics,
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with using assisted ventilation in the treatment of patients
with SARS (12). While randomized clinical trials have not
been conducted, careful compilations of existing case
series data would be helpful in evaluating the potential
effectiveness of various management regimens. 
The store of clinical data, accumulated from treating
hundreds of SARS cases, needs to be put to good use. One
priority is to investigate clinical, epidemiologic, and labo-
ratory predictors of poor outcome. Such experience will
supplement other recently published data from Hong
Kong, Special Administrative Region (1,13–15), and
Singapore (16).
Several questions remain unanswered. Do patients
exposed to high viral doses (for which a short incubation
period may be a surrogate) or to a co-infecting pathogen
have poorer outcomes? What is the impact of multiple
exposures to SARS-associated coronavirus, like that which
occurred among healthcare workers early in the epidemic?
Do patients infected early in the transmission cycle per-
form more poorly than those infected during subsequent
cycles of transmission?
Learning from the SARS Epidemic
Seldom have intersections between politics, economic
development, and public health been more graphically
demonstrated. While awaiting the development of effec-
tive prophylactic and therapeutic options, many countries
have had to muster substantial political will for quick and
transparent steps to declare the presence of a lethal
pathogen within their borders; conduct surveillance and
report the results; use contact tracing, quarantine, and bor-
der control measures when needed; and apply stringent
infection control measures in healthcare settings.
Providing the general public with timely and candid infor-
mation about the magnitude of the problem, the known
risks, and how persons can protect themselves has also
been necessary. These actions were necessary even when
they appeared contrary to economic interests in the short
run. Delaying implementation can result in major public
health consequences, in addition to damage to the econo-
my and national image. 
The work outlined here involves descriptive and epi-
demiologic inquiry, fundamental to establishing an under-
standing of this new pathogen and disease. While refined
and esoteric research will likely also be conducted, support
must first be established for systematically addressing
these basic questions and rapidly disseminating results
through publication in international journals, presentations
at international meetings, and in public communications.
In China, in contrast with many other settings globally, sci-
entific inquiry and dissemination of results to the interna-
tional community are subject to institutional interference.
The SARS pandemic has shown that virulent pathogens
are beholden to no political philosophy or edict. Only care-
ful and rapid application of knowledge and reason through
a variety of public health measures has been effective in
minimizing the spread and severity of the SARS epidemic.
More information and data generated from studies of the
epidemic in China are needed immediately to save lives
and to prevent fear and disease, both in China itself and
elsewhere in the world. 
SARS became a public health emergency for China,
where investment in health services has been given low
priority for many years. Maintaining control in a country
so large and diverse will be a major challenge for the
months, and perhaps years, to come. Each of China’s
mainland provinces (including municipalities with equiva-
lent status, autonomous regions, and special administrative
regions) is like a country within a country. Many are larg-
er than most countries in Europe. Some, such as Shanghai,
are wealthy and highly developed, while others such as
Guangxi (bordering Guangdong and Vietnam) are poor
and typical of developing countries. Given the potential for
reemergence of SARS in the future, if sustained control
measures are not in place in China, the possibility of con-
trolling the global threat posed by the disease until new
technology (i.e., an effective vaccine) is available may be
slight. Key strategies include effective disease surveillance
and reporting with early detection and isolation; hospital
infection control during triage and treatment of cases; and
transparent, open public communication about risk and
disease magnitude. 
China has recently begun to vigorously address the
need for better surveillance, accurate reporting, and forth-
right public communication. Substantial epidemiologic,
clinical, virologic, and immunologic expertise and interest
are available within China to address the fundamental
questions. International expertise is also available to pro-
vide guidance, feedback, and assistance when requested.
Identifying the modest resources needed to implement the
work should not be a barrier. Support from the government
will be needed to carry out valid, transparent studies, and
for permission to report the findings, regardless of the con-
clusions. SARS provides a jarring reminder of the pre-
paredness that is needed to respond to emerging and exist-
ing disease threats; it highlights the need to reinvest in
health in China, and strengthen public health programs,
including surveillance systems and response capacity. 
While disease incidence has abated in China and in
other locations globally, the disease may still represent an
important threat in the future. Many of the solutions to
solve the multifaceted puzzle of SARS and to prevent
future epidemics must come from China. Without solu-
tions from that country, the degree of difficulty for sus-
tained control of the problem globally is raised still higher. 
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